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Abstract
Background: The WHO suggested that governments stockpile, as part of preparations for the
next influenza pandemic, sufficient influenza antiviral drugs to treat approximately 25% of their
populations. Our aim is two-fold: first, since in many countries the antiviral stockpile is well below
this level, we search for suboptimal strategies based on treatme nt provide d onl y to an age -
dependent fraction of cases. Second, since in some countries the stockpile exceeds the suggested
minimum level, we search for optimal strategies for post-exposure prophylactic treatment of close
contacts of cases.
Methods: We used a stochastic, spatially structured individual-based model, considering explicit
transmission in households, schools and workplaces, to simulate the spatiotemporal spread of an
influenza pandemic in Italy and to evaluate the efficacy of interventions based on age-prioritized use
of antivirals.
Results: Our results show that the antiviral stockpile required for treatment of cases ranges from
10% to 35% of the population for R0 in 1.4 – 3. No suboptimal strategies, based on treatment
provided to an age-dependent fraction of cases, were found able to remarkably reduce both clinical
attack rate and antiviral drugs needs, though they can contribute to largely reduce the excess
mortality. Treatment of all cases coupled with prophylaxis provided to younger individuals is the
only intervention resulting in a significant reduction of the clinical attack rate and requiring a
relatively small stockpile of antivirals.
Conclusion: Our results strongly suggest that governments stockpile sufficient influenza antiviral
drugs to treat approximately 25% of their populations, under the assumption that R0 is not much
larger than 2. In countries where the number of antiviral stockpiled exceeds the suggested
minimum level, providing prophylaxis to younger individuals is an option that could be taken into
account in preparedness plans. In countries where the number of antivirals stockpiled is well below
25% of the population, priority should be decided based on age-specific case fatality rates.
However, late detection of cases (administration of antivirals 48 hours after the clinical onset of
symptoms) dramatically affects the efficacy of both treatment and prophylaxis.
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Background
At the time of writing, a new subtype of influenza
A(H1N1) virus is rapidly spreading worldwide [1], with
over 39,000 cases and 167 deaths (17 June 2009). Devel-
oping measures for controlling the ongoing and future
influenza pandemics represents a crucial challenge for
public health agencies worldwide.
In order to test the effectiveness of containing/mitigating
strategies included in national pandemic preparedness
plans, mathematical models have become a relevant tool
[2]. Various mathematical models have been proposed for
describing the spatiotemporal spread of a possible new
influenza pandemic and for evaluating the impact of con-
trol measures [3-7].
In general, non-pharmaceutical interventions, such as
travel restrictions and social distancing measures, might
delay the epidemic arrival and peak, while pharmaceutical
interventions, such as the use of vaccines and antivirals,
might reduce the overall impact of the epidemic. Specifi-
cally, antiviral treatment of influenza cases reduces trans-
missibility and, according to recent results [8,9], case
fatality rates, while post-exposure prophylaxis reduces
susceptibility to infection and prevents cases [3].
The World Health Organization suggested that govern-
ments stockpile, as part of preparations for the next influ-
enza pandemic, sufficient influenza antiviral drugs to treat
approximately 25% of their populations. This recommen-
dation was made with the understanding that the stock-
piled drugs would, in the whole, be used for treatment as
opposed to significant prophylaxis. Remarkably, however,
in many countries the antiviral stockpile is well below the
suggested minimum level. For instance, the antivirals
stockpiled in Italy are sufficient to treat only 7 million
individuals [10], corresponding to the 12% of the popu-
lation. Therefore, in this study we face the problem of pri-
oritizing the use of antivirals for treatment of cases as a
preventive measure for mitigating the spread of an influ-
enza pandemic as long as a pandemic vaccine is not avail-
able. On the other hand, in some countries the antiviral
stockpile exceeds the number actually required for the
treatment of all cases [10]. Thus, we also search for opti-
mal strategies for prioritizing the use of antivirals for post-
exposure prophylactic treatment of close contacts of cases.
In this case, however, it should be taken into account,
that, once the pandemic is well established, antiviral
drugs for prophylaxis should also be provided to high-risk
healthcare workers and emergency services personnel for
the duration of community pandemic outbreaks.
Methods
To evaluate strategies for prioritizing the use of antivirals
in the general population, we performed a systematic sim-
ulation study of the spread of an influenza pandemic and
of the efficacy of age-prioritized use of antivirals for treat-
ment and prophylaxis, building on the microsimulation
model developed for Italy as described in [6,11].
Briefly, the worldwide spread of influenza pandemic and
the consequent importation of cases in Italy were mod-
elled using a deterministic homogeneous-mixing SEIR
(Susceptible – Exposed, but not yet infectious -Infected –
Removed) model. Then we predicted the national impact
of the epidemic in Italy using a stochastic, spatially-
explicit SEIR model with force of infection depending on
the distance and explicit transmission in households,
schools and workplaces.
Different transmission scenarios were drawn by varying
the basic reproductive number R0 of the epidemic (i.e. the
average number of secondary cases a typical single
infected case will cause in a fully susceptible population
[12]). In general, the larger the value of R0, the harder it is
to control the epidemic.
Specifically, we considered scenarios characterized by R0 =
1.4, 1.7, 2. Such values of R0 comply with those observed
in past influenza pandemics [13-16]. Since values of R0
much larger than 2 were observed in some cities during
the 1918–19 Spanish influenza (see [17] for a review), we
also considered a scenario characterized by R0 = 3.
Transmission models
Worldwide transmission model
The worldwide spread of influenza pandemic and the
consequent importation of cases in Italy were modelled
using a deterministic homogeneous-mixing SEIR model.
This model was used for determining the number of
imported cases in Italy from abroad over time.
National transmission model
The national impact of the epidemic in Italy was predicted
using a stochastic, spatially-explicit individual-based
model [4,6]. For each individual i we define:
￿ Hi as the set of the ni individuals belonging to the
same household of individual i;
￿   as the set of the   individuals attending the
same school (index j = 1,...,6 identifies school types,
from day care centers to university) or sharing the
same workplace (index j  = 7,...,13 identifies work-
places of increasing size, see Figure 1c) of individual i;
Any susceptible individual i, at any time t of the simula-
tion has a probability   of becoming
infected, where Δt = 0.25 days is the time-step of the sim-
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Sociodemography Figure 1
Sociodemography. a Frequency distributions of household size for the different household types (in blue) and frequency dis-
tribution of the different household types (in red) considered in the model. b Age distribution from census data (blue) and sim-
ulated (red). c Proportion of workers for class of workplace from industry census data (blue) and simulated (red). d Probability 
density function of travel distances as obtained by using the gravity model (3) (in blue) compared with that obtained by using 
the the distance kernel (2) (in red).BMC Infectious Diseases 2009, 9:117 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/9/117
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ulation and  i is the instantaneous risk of infection. The
latter is the sum of the risks coming from the three mod-
elled source of infections, namely contacts with infectious
members of the household, contacts with infectious indi-
viduals working in the same workplace or attending the
same school, random contacts in the population:
The terms in Eq. (1) are defined as follows:
￿ N is the total population, i.e. ≈ 57, 000, 000 of indi-
viduals;
￿ Ik = 1 if individual k is infected, 0 otherwise;
￿  h is the within-household transmission coefficient,
 are the within-school/workplace transmission
coefficients and  r is the transmission coefficient for
random contacts. The different transmission scenarios
were drawn by varying the transmission parameters.
￿  i is the time in which individual i became infectious
and (T) is a lognormal function describing infectious-
ness over time. Estimates of incubation period (1.48 ±
0.47 days) and infectiousness period ( )
lead to a generation time Tg = 2.6 days (as in [2]);
￿ Ck = 1 for symptomatic cases (we assume 50% of
cases to be symptomatic), 0 otherwise. Since   = 2, the
infectiousness of symptomatic cases doubles the one
of asymptomatic cases (as in [2]);
￿   = 0.8 scales the household transmission rates with
household size (as in [2]);
￿   is a function accounting for induced absen-
teeism and it is defined as follows: if T > 0.25 (the
minimum time for recognizing the infection) 
is set to: 0.1 for j = 1, 2; 0.2 for j = 3, 4; 0.25 for j = 5;
0.5 for j = 6,...,13; 1 otherwise;
￿ as in [2,4,6], we assume that random contacts in the
population depend explicitly on the distance dik
between infectious individual k and susceptible indi-
vidual i. The probability that an infectious individual
k infects individual i is weighted by the kernel function
with a = 3.8 km and   = 2.32 [6].
We assume that 33% of transmission occurs in house-
holds, 33% in schools or workplaces and 33% in the gen-
eral community [2,6].
Epidemiological parameters
In the worldwide model, we assumed that infectious indi-
viduals were all symptomatic and no longer traveling and
that exposed individuals were asymptomatic and possibly
traveling before the infectious phase. In the national
model, infectious individuals were divided into sympto-
matic and asymptomatic classes. Once an individual
become infectious, the probability of developing symp-
toms was set to 0.5. In both models, we assumed that the
latency period for influenza was the same as the incuba-
tion period: duration of 1.5 (± 0.5 standard deviation)
days. In the national model, we assumed that the duration
of infectiousness varied over time, as a lognormal func-
tion [2,4,6]. Infectiousness peaked at 1.75 days, and its
duration was truncated at 10 days. This corresponded to
an average generation time of 2.6 days. In the worldwide
model, the infectious period was assumed to be constant
over time and was set at 1.5 days, to give essentially the
same growth rate as the national model [4,6].
Excess mortality
Though it is not possible to predict death rates in future
pandemics (reliable estimates are not available yet for the
ongoing A(H1N1) influenza outbreak), it is important to
assess the effects of antiviral treatment and prophylaxis
under different assumptions on age-specific case fatality
rates. We used results presented in [18] on the lethal
1918–19 influenza pandemic in Copenhagen (scenario
EM1918), where deaths occurred primarily among young
persons, and in [19] on the mild 1969–70 influenza pan-
demic in Italy (scenario EM1969), where deaths occurred
primarily among elderly (as during inter-pandemic sea-
sons), to estimate age-specific case fatality rates. Basically,
we assumed that the estimated age-specific excess mortal-
ity rates as reported in [18] were associated to an epidemic
with R0 = 2 (authors report estimates of R0 in 2.2–2.4 for
the Summer wave and R0 ≈ 1.2 for the Fall wave, due to
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preexisting immunity in the population) and we esti-
mated age-specific case fatality rates (for symptomatic
individuals) in such a way that the age-specific excess
mortality rates as obtained by running simulations with
R0 = 2 comply with the values reported in [18]. The result-
ing age-specific case fatality rates were used to estimate
age-specific excess mortality in all the considered trans-
mission scenarios. Similarly for the data on the 1969–70
influenza pandemic in Italy, where we assumed R0 = 1.4
(estimated value in the range 1.3–1.6 [20]).
Imported cases over time
To estimate the number of imported cases over time, we
coupled the results of the worldwide model with 2003
data on arrivals and departures in Italy's 38 international
airports. More in detail, the number of imported cases
over time was estimated by sampling a Poisson distribu-
tion of parameter  , where p is the total number of
passengers arriving daily in Italy (≈ 70, 000 on average),
E(t) is the number of exposed individuals at time t pre-
dicted by the global homogeneous-mixing model, N is the
world population and Δt is the time step of the simula-
tion.
Simulated sociodemographic structure
Households
In the national model, individuals were randomly
grouped in households to match the 2001 census data
(Italian Institute of Statistics: XIV Censimento generale
della popolazione e delle abitazioni, 2001. Available at
url http://dawinci.istat.it/MD/) on age structure and data
from a specific 2003 survey (Italian Institute of Statistics:
Strutture familiari e opinioni su famiglia e figli, 2003.
Available at url http://www.istat.it/dati/catalogo/
20060621_03/) on household size and composition.
Nine different types of households were considered (e.g.,
singles or couples, with or without children, with or with-
out additional members, adults living together) and indi-
viduals were co-located in households according to
specific data on the percentage of the different household
types, their size, the age of the household head. Frequency
distribution of household sizes for the different house-
hold types are shown in Figure 1a, together with the fre-
quency distribution of the household types. The
availability of these data allowed us to develop a very real-
istic model of the mixing of the age classes within house-
holds. The resulting age structure of the population is
shown Figure 1b and it agrees well with the 2001 census
data.
Schools and workplaces
The Italian population at 2001 is structured as follows: 20,
559, 595 workers, 11, 360, 556 students and 25, 084, 274
unemployed or retired. Children and young adults were
assigned to one of six levels of school (i.e., from day care
to university) on the basis of age and specific data on
school attendance by age (Italian Ministry of University
and Research: La scuola in cifre, 2005. Available at url
http://statistica.miur.it/. Italian Ministry of University and
Research: L'universitá in cifre, 2005. Available at url http:/
/statistica.miur.it/). Attendance to school varies widely
with age: it ranges from 14% in day care centers, to 90%
in kindergartens, approximately 100% in primary and
middle schools, 82% in high schools, 31% in university.
We used specific data on employment rate by age in Italy
to assign an employment to individuals aged more than
15 years. Workers were randomly assigned to one of seven
employment categories, defined by the number of
employees in the workplace (see Figure 1c) (Italian Insti-
tute of Statistics: VIII Censimento generale dell'industria e
dei servizi, 2001. Available at url http://dawinci.istat.it/
cis/). Teachers and school employees were also consid-
ered in the model.
Commuting
We modelled travel destinations by using specific Italian
data on travels between place of residence and place of
work or study. Specifically, we used a gravity model [21],
in which the probability of commuting from municipality
i to municipality j increases with the population sizes and
decreases with the distance:
where pi and pj represent the number of individuals living
in municipality i and j respectively and dij is the distance
between the two municipalities.   is a proportionality con-
stant,  d = 0.28 and  r = 0.66 tune the dependence of disper-
sal on donor and recipient sizes and   = 2.95 tunes the
dependence on the distance. Model parameters were opti-
mized as in [6] in order to take into account that the frac-
tion of commuters (individuals traveling outside the
municipality of residence for work or study) in Italy varies
significantly from South to North of Italy, ranging from
15% in Southern Italy to 60% in Northern Italy. Figure 1d
shows the resulting probability density function of travel
distances, compared with that obtained by using a model
depending only on the distance, namely Eq. (2), used for
modelling the transmission in the general population.
Prioritizing antiviral treatment and prophylaxis
Both treatment and prophylaxis were assumed to start 24
or 48 hours after the clinical onset of symptoms in the
index case. Treatment of the index case was assumed to
reduce infectiousness by 70% [2-6], whereas antiviral
prophylaxis was assumed to reduce susceptibility to infec-
pt
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tion by 30%, infectiousness by 70%, and the occurrence
of symptomatic disease by 60% [3]. Since it is not realistic
that governments will implement prophylaxis without
treating index cases first, we consider prophylaxis assum-
ing that antiviral treatment is provided to the index cases.
We assumed that 90% of the clinical cases (corresponding
to 45% of infected individuals) are identified and treated
and that antiviral prophylaxis is provided to the close con-
tacts, namely household contacts, with a treatment course
of 10 days [7]. We assumed that treatment with antivirals
is associated with a significant reduction in mortality
(70%) [8,9].
We considered administering antiviral treatment and
prophylaxis for the entire epidemic period. Population
was divided into three classes, namely children and young
adults (2–25 years old, individuals younger than 2 years
old are excluded since antivirals can not be administered
to them [22]), adults (26–64 years old) and elderly (≥65
years old), on the basis of the clinical attack rates by age as
resulting from the baseline simulations (Figure 2c), which
are consistent with data on attack rates by age classes as
reported in [23] for the 1918–19 influenza pandemic. We
conducted a systematic simulation study for assessing the
effects of targeting the different classes in reducing the
number of cases and the excess mortality by minimizing
the number of antiviral courses required. To such aim, we
consider the number of avoided clinical cases (with
respect to the baseline simulations) for each antiviral
course as an indicator of efficacy of the different interven-
tion options.
Results
Baseline scenarios
On average, the first Italian case arises 76, 48, 36 and 21
days after the first world case for R0 = 1.4, R0 = 1.7, R0 = 2
and R0 = 3, respectively. Figure 2a shows the stochastic
variability in timing of initial case in the baseline scenar-
ios. After the initial highly stochastic phase, the stochastic-
ity decreases over time because of the high number of
imported cases over time that, together with long distance
travels, contributes to synchronize the local epidemics.
Therefore, the simulated epidemics are very stable in
terms of parameters as clinical attack rate, peak day and
peak daily case incidence. On average, the clinical attack
rate is 21.7%, 29.7%, 35.9% and 43.8% for R0 = 1.4, R0 =
1.7, R0 = 2 and R0 = 3 respectively (see first row of Figure
3). The peak day is at 193, 123, 94 and 58 days respec-
tively (see second row of Figure 3) and the peak daily case
incidence is 0.44%, 0.96%, 1.59% and 2.85% respectively
(see third row of Figure 3). Figure 2b shows the expected
pattern of spread for the different transmission scenarios
considered.
The time needed from the moment that the vaccine seed
virus is available until the first vaccine dose can be used is
currently 4 months at best [24]. Other estimates are 6
months at best [25,26]. Remarkably, according to these
estimates the pandemic vaccine will be available in time
only in case of a mild epidemic (see Figure 2b). Moreover,
the continuous importation of cases make unsuitable all
containing strategies based on the isolation and treatment
of the first clusters of cases. These findings support the
hypothesis that, in large countries, social distancing meas-
ures (e.g. school and non essential workplaces closure,
case isolation), travel restrictions and pharmaceutical
measures based on antiviral treatment of index cases and
prophylaxis to close contacts will be key in mitigating and
delaying the epidemic as long as the pandemic vaccine is
not available. Figure 2d shows the expected age-specific
excess mortality in the four considered transmission sce-
narios and by assuming two different patterns of mortal-
ity, namely scenarios EM1918  and  EM1969. In the
EM1918 scenario, the excess mortality is estimated to be
14.4/10, 000, 19.5/10, 000, 23.3/10, 000 and 27.8/10,
000 for R0 = 1.4, R0 = 1.7, R0 = 2 and R0 = 3 respectively
(see first row of Figure 4). In the EM1969 scenario, it is
estimated to be 2.6/10, 000, 3.8/10, 000, 5.1/10, 000 and
7.2/10, 000 respectively (see second row of Figure 4).
Age-prioritized use of antivirals: early detection of index 
cases
We first assume that index cases and close contacts are
treated 24 hours after the onset of symptoms in the index
cases. If antivirals are used for treatment only, for all age
classes, attack rates will decrease to 10.5%, 20.1%, 27.9%
and 39.1% (see first row of Figure 3), requiring an antivi-
ral stockpile for treating 5, 10, 14 and 20 million individ-
uals (corresponding to the 9.4%, 17.8%, 24.7% and
34.6% of the population, see first row of Figure 5), for R0
= 1.4, R0 = 1.7, R0 = 2 and R0 = 3 respectively. Moreover,
the epidemic peak is slightly delayed (of about 37, 15, 8
and 3 days respectively, see second row of Figure 3) and
the peak daily case incidence is greatly reduced (by about
72%, 51%, 39% and 24% respectively, see third row of
Figure 3). The number of avoided cases for each antiviral
course is 1.2, 0.54, 0.32 and 0.14 respectively (see second
row of Figure 5). The excess mortality is greatly reduced by
assuming age-specific case fatality rates as those estimated
for both the 1918–19 and 1969–70 pandemics. In the
EM1918 scenario, the excess mortality is reduced by 69%,
56%, 50% and 42% for R0 = 1.4, R0 = 1.7, R0 = 2 and R0 =
3 respectively (see first row of Figure 4). In the EM1969
scenario, the excess mortality is reduced by 75%, 65%,
58% and 50% respectively (see second row of Figure 4).
Treatment of elderly does not lead to any significant
reduction of the cumulative number of cases, while the
effects of treating younger population and adults are sim-
ilar to those observed when treatment is considered for all
age classes. This means that treatment of elderly has a
poor effect in reducing the cumulative attack rate. In fact,BMC Infectious Diseases 2009, 9:117 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/9/117
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Baseline simulations Figure 2
Baseline simulations. Timing for initial case for R0 = 1.4 (green), R0 = 1.7 (blue), R0 = 2 (red) and R0 = 3 (violet) in the baseline 
scenarios. Histograms are based on 100 simulations each. b Expected case incidence over time (solid lines) and 95% confidence 
intervals (shaded regions) based on 100 simulations for each scenario. Colors as in a. The black time window indicate a reason-
able time interval for the availability of a pandemic vaccine. c Cumulative clinical attack rate by age (colors as in a), compared 
with data on the 1918–19 pandemic [23] (black line). The vertical dashed lines identify the age classes, namely young, adults and 
elderly, defined for age-prioritization of the use of antivirals. d Expected excess mortality by age classes (colors as in a) as 
obtained by assuming two different age-specific case fatality rates, similar to those estimated for the 1918–19 pandemic in 
Copenhagen (solid lines) and for the 1969–70 pandemic in Italy (dashed lines). Note that in the latter case, the expected excess 
mortality in the younger age classes (0–64 years old) is very close to 0 for all the R0 values considered.BMC Infectious Diseases 2009, 9:117 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/9/117
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when treating only the elderly, the number of avoided
cases for each antiviral course decreases by 68%, 56%,
47% and 36% for R0 = 1.4, R0 = 1.7, R0 = 2 and R0 = 3
respectively. The number of avoided cases for each antivi-
ral course is similar when treatment is considered only for
young or adult individuals (see last row of Figure 5).
Results can be different when considering the effects on
excess mortality (see Figure 4). By assuming age-specific
case fatality rates similar to those estimated for the 1918–
19 influenza pandemic in Copenhagen, treatment of
adults is much more effective (the excess mortality
decreases by 41.2%-28% for R0 in 1.4–3) than treatment
of elderly population (the excess mortality decreases only
by 2.8%-0.8% for R0 in 1.4–3). The opposite pattern is
observed by assuming age-specific case fatality rates simi-
lar to those estimated for the 1969–70 influenza pan-
demic in Italy: treatment of adults is much less effective
(the excess mortality decreases by 33.8%-12% for R0 in
1.4–3) than treatment of elderly (the excess mortality
decreases by 37.9%-36.9% for R0 in 1.4–3).
When prophylaxis is provided to close contacts of index
cases, the clinical attack rates decrease to 4.9%, 13.7%,
20.6% and 30.8% (see first row of Figure 3), but a larger
antiviral stockpile is required (sufficient to treat 8, 21, 31
and 42 million individuals, corresponding to the 13.8%,
37.2%, 53.8% and 73.8% of the population, see first row
Age-prioritized use of antivirals during an influenza pandemic in Italy: timing and impact Figure 3
Age-prioritized use of antivirals during an influenza pandemic in Italy: timing and impact. Clinical attack rates, 
peak day and peak daily clinical attack rate for baseline simulations (green), for antiviral treatment provided to index cases of all 
age classes (blue) or provided only to specific age classes (cyan, Y = young, A = adults, E = elderly), and for post-exposure pro-
phylactic treatment provided to all age classes (red) or only to specific age classes (orange, Y = young, A = adults, E = elderly). 
When post-exposure prophylactic treatment is considered, we assume that antiviral treatment is also provided to index cases.BMC Infectious Diseases 2009, 9:117 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/9/117
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of Figure 5), for R0 = 1.4, R0 = 1.7, R0 = 2 and R0 = 3 respec-
tively. Moreover, the epidemic peak is significantly
delayed (of about 60, 26, 14 and 6 days respectively, see
second row of Figure 3) and the peak daily case incidence
decreases (approximately by 93%, 76%, 66% and 52%
respectively, see third row of Figure 3), with respect to the
baseline scenarios. The number of avoided cases for each
antiviral course is similar to that observed for antiviral
treatment, namely 1.22, 0.43, 0.28 and 0.18, respectively
for the four transmission scenarios considered (see sec-
ond row of Figure 5). By assuming age-specific case fatal-
ity rates similar to those estimated for the 1918–19
influenza pandemic in Copenhagen, the excess mortality
decreases by 51.6%, 29%, 22.1%, and 14.7% with respect
to treatment of all cases for R0 = 1.4, R0 = 1.7 R0 = 2 and R0
= 3 respectively (see first row of Figure 4). The excess mor-
tality decreases even more by assuming age-specific case
fatality rates similar to those estimated for the 1969–70
influenza pandemic in Italy, namely 56.5%, 36%, 29.7%,
and 23.2% (see second row of Figure 4). Providing proph-
ylaxis only to individuals in some age classes results in the
same patterns observed above for the age-prioritized treat-
ment of index cases (see Figure 3 and Figure 5). Age-prior-
itized prophylaxis does not result in a significant
reduction of the excess mortality with respect to the treat-
ment of all cases (see Figure 4). In fact, when considering
prophylaxis to close contacts of cases we are assuming that
treatment is first provided to all index cases.
Prophylaxis provided to younger individuals is the only
intervention allowing a relevant reduction of the cumula-
tive clinical attack rates (they decrease to 7.5%, 17.1%,
24.9% and 36.3%, respectively for the four transmission
scenarios considered) with a significant reduction of the
antiviral stockpile required (sufficient to treat 7, 14, 20
and 27 million individuals, corresponding to the 11.5%,
25.3%, 35.3% and 47.5% of the population), at least
when R0 is no much larger than 2 (see Figure 3 and 5).
Age-prioritized use of antivirals: late detection of index 
cases
We now assume that index cases and close contacts are
treated 48 hours after the onset of symptoms in the index
cases. It is worth noticing that this delay results in a dra-
matic decrease of the intervention efficacy and, in general,
a larger number of antivirals stockpiled is required and a
Age-prioritized use of antivirals during an influenza pandemic in Italy: excess mortality Figure 4
Age-prioritized use of antivirals during an influenza pandemic in Italy: excess mortality. Expected excess mortality 
as obtained by assuming two different age-specific case fatality rates, similar to those estimated for the 1918–19 influenza pan-
demic in Copenhagen and for the 1969–70 influenza pandemic in Italy respectively, for baseline simulations (green), for antiviral 
treatment provided to index cases of all age classes (blue) or provided only to specific age classes (cyan, Y = young, A = adults, 
E = elderly), and for post-exposure prophylactic treatment provided to all age classes (red) or only to specific age classes 
(orange, Y = young, A = adults, E = elderly).BMC Infectious Diseases 2009, 9:117 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/9/117
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lower decrease of the clinical attack rate is observed. When
treatment is considered for all index cases, the clinical
attack rate decreases to 14.9%, 23.9% and 31.1% for R0 =
1.4, R0 = 1.7 and R0 = 2 respectively and the number of
avoided cases divided by the number of persons treated
decreases to 0.51, 0.27 and 0.18. When prophylaxis is also
considered, the clinical attack rate decreases to 9.1%,
17.9% and 25.1% for R0 = 1.4, R0 = 1.7 and R0 = 2 respec-
tively and the number of avoided cases divided by the
number of persons treated decreases to 0.55, 0.27 and
0.19. Even worst efficacies are observed when R0 = 3.
Realizations and results variability
Results presented in this section were obtained by averag-
ing over 15 simulations for each transmission scenario
considered (but for the baseline simulations which were
based on 100 simulations). This certainly represents a
number large enough to guarantee the stability of the
results. Specifically, only the timing of the initial cases is
highly variable (however, this is due to the high stochas-
ticity of the epidemic in its initial phase). On the contrary,
the epidemiological indicators depending on the whole
course of the epidemic are very stable: standard deviations
are less than 0.02% of the population for the cumulative
attack rates, less than 6 days for the peak day and less than
0.04% of the population for the peak daily case incidence.
Discussion
A recent study conducted in Italy [6] has shown that the
use of antivirals, for treatment of index cases and post-
exposure prophylactic treatment of household contacts, is
the most effective single intervention strategy, resulting in
a relevant reduction of the cumulative clinical attack rate,
namely of 78%, 50% and 36%, for R0 = 1.4 R0 = 1.7 and
R0 = 2.1, respectively. In addition, their use contributes to
delay the epidemic peak and to decrease the peak daily
case incidence. Similar results have been shown for UK
and US [4,5]. Moreover, school and workplace prophy-
laxis could dramatically increase the impact, in terms of
reduction of the clinical attack rate [4,6].
However, critically, the antiviral stockpile required is rele-
vant. In Italy [6], an antiviral stockpile large enough to
treat 20 to 30 million of individuals (corresponding to the
35% and 53% of the population) is needed for R0 in 1.7 –
2. For R0 = 1.7, the antiviral stockpile required decreases to
Age-prioritized use of antivirals during an influenza pandemic in Italy: antiviral stockpile Figure 5
Age-prioritized use of antivirals during an influenza pandemic in Italy: antiviral stockpile. Antiviral stockpile 
required and number of avoided cases divided by the number of persons treated for antiviral treatment provided to index 
cases of all age classes (blue) or provided only to specific age classes (cyan, Y = young, A = adults, E = elderly), and for post-
exposure prophylactic treatment provided to all age classes (red) or only to specific age classes (orange, Y = young, A = adults, 
E = elderly). When post-exposure prophylactic treatment is considered, we assume that antiviral treatment is also provided to 
index cases. The horizontal black line represents the Italian antiviral stockpile.BMC Infectious Diseases 2009, 9:117 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/9/117
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17% of the population only with the availability of a vac-
cine within 4 months after the first world case and by con-
sidering large scale social distancing measures (e.g., 90%
air travel restriction and school closure for 2 months). For
R0 = 2.1, the antiviral stockpile required is about 35% of
the population. Similar results were obtained in US [4],
where the antiviral stockpile required ranges from 25% to
60% of the population, depending on the transmission
scenario and the different mitigation measures considered
(school/workplace prophylaxis excluded).
We conducted a systematic simulation study of the age-
prioritized use of antivirals for mitigating and delaying an
influenza pandemic. By assuming R0 no much larger than
2, our results confirm that the antiviral stockpile required
for the treatment of cases ranges from 10% to 25% on the
basis of the transmission scenario considered. If R0 = 3,
the stockpile required for the treatment of cases increases
to 35% of the population. Treatment of index cases is
effective in mitigating the epidemic (decrease of cumula-
tive attack rate ranges from 11% to 52% in the four con-
sidered transmission scenarios, decrease of peak daily case
incidence ranges from 24% to 72%). By assuming that
treatment with antivirals is associated with a significant
reduction in mortality (70%), a large decreases in the
excess mortality is observed in all the transmission scenar-
ios considered (ranging from 42% to 75%).
No suboptimal strategies, based on the treatment of a frac-
tion of cases on an age basis, were found able to remarka-
bly reduce both the clinical attack rate and the antiviral
stockpile required. Remarkably, however, a significant
reduction of the excess mortality can be achieved by treat-
ing only a specific fraction of the population, depending
on age-specific case fatality rates: treatment of adults is
more effective if age-specific case fatality rates are similar
to those estimated for the 1918–19 influenza pandemic in
Copenhagen while treatment of elderly is more effective if
age-specific case fatality rates are similar to those esti-
mated for the 1969–70 influenza pandemic in Italy.
Therefore, early estimates of age-specific cases fatality rates
can be crucial for optimizing the use of antivirals during
an influenza pandemic. Moreover, we have shown that
treatment of elderly does not lead to any significant reduc-
tion of the cumulative attack rate and that the efficacy of
treating younger population and adults are similar, but
with a different cost in terms of antiviral doses required.
Treatment provided to all cases coupled to prophylaxis for
younger individuals is the only intervention allowing a
significant reduction of the cumulative clinical attack rate
with a significant reduction of antiviral courses required,
with respect to provide prophylaxis to the all close con-
tacts of cases. To implement this strategy, the antiviral
stockpile should be large enough to treat about the 12%,
25%, 35% and 47.% of the population, for R0 = 1.4, R0 =
1.7, R0 = 2 and R0 = 3 respectively. Since the antivirals
stockpiled in Italy are sufficient to treat only about 7 mil-
lions individuals, corresponding to the 12% of the popu-
lation, Italy seems to be able to mitigate an influenza
pandemic only at the very beginning of the outbreak.
However, the implementation of social distancing meas-
ures (e.g. isolation of index cases and school/workplace
closure), travel restrictions could slow down the spread of
the epidemic. Consequently, the antiviral stockpile
required could be significantly lower than that predicted
by our model and time could be gained for pandemic vac-
cine production and distribution, at least under moderate
transmission scenarios.
In our study we did not consider treatment and prophy-
laxis for specific categories, such as patients admitted to
hospital, health care workers with direct patient contact
and emergency medical service providers, highest risk
patients (young children 12–23 months old, elderly ≥65
years old), public safety workers (police, fire, corrections),
and government decision makers. These policies are con-
sistent with medical practice and ethics to treat those with
serious illness and who are most likely to die and those
groups which are critical for an effective public health
response to a pandemic (preventing absenteeism and
maintaining societal functions). Specific work should be
conducted for modelling these interventions in order to
refine our estimates. However, our strategies of age prior-
itization could have important ethical impacts that
should be taken into account. Recently, the WHO has
developed specific guidelines to take into account ethical
considerations in developing a public health response to
pandemic influenza [27]. As regards age-based prioritiza-
tion, it is stated that "the goal of reducing overall disease
burden might also provide a rationale for favouring
younger persons, even if the fair innings argument is not
accepted".
However, "age-based prioritization criteria should be
adopted only after wide public consultation". Moreover,
the potential impact of resistance of the circulating strain
to antiviral drugs should also be considered [28-31]. The
extent of such may cause substantial revision to polices
regarding the use of such drugs during the next pandemic.
In fact, our results should also consider the possibility of
the emergence of an antiviral resistant strain as observed
in the last two influenza seasons for influenza A(H1N1)
strain [32]. The circulation of transmissible oseltamivir-
resistant virus may preclude the use of oseltamivir for
post-exposure prophylactic treatment of close contacts.
However, certain countries have differentiated their stock-
pile acquiring also zanamivir which is particularly rele-
vant in light of emerging resistance to oseltamivir. This
implies that additional antiviral reserve capacity isBMC Infectious Diseases 2009, 9:117 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/9/117
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required and this is likely to come primarily from zanami-
vir [32].
Our study also highlights the importance of the early
detection of cases. In fact, great effort should be made in
order to establish a surveillance system able to detect and
treat cases as soon as possible since a delay of more than
24 hours could make both antiviral treatment and proph-
ylaxis very inefficient. This means that, to be successful,
preparedness to pandemic should not be only stockpiling
of antiviral courses. A great effort should also be made in
organizing antiviral distribution and implementing spe-
cificity and sensitivity of existing surveillance systems for
seasonal influenza, in order to detect cases as soon as pos-
sible in the occurrence of the emergence of an influenza
pandemic. Antiviral drugs must be given early in the
course of infection to reduce symptoms (maximum 48
hours) and before any prospect of knowing the sensitivity
of the virus [33,34]. Viral loads begin to decrease 24–48
hours after he onset of symptoms and late antiviral ther-
apy is unhelpful [35]. This critical aspect may have impor-
tant implications on infrastructure for care delivery. Since
health systems may be overwhelmed during a pandemic,
new care services for providing the usual health care serv-
ices (such as drug delivery in hospital or in pharmacies or
directly at home) should be considered in order to timely
distribute antivirals to cases and close contacts. Also,
monitoring systems able to detect adverse events should
be considered. However, this aspects are directly related to
the organization of the health care system, and should be
tailored on the basis of the different resources available.
A characteristic feature of pandemics is to appear in a
series of waves. Results presented in this work could be
considered fairly unrealistic if waves were determined by
virus mutations resulting in the elimination (even partial)
of acquired immunity in the population. In fact, a much
larger cumulative attack rate would be expected during a
series of wave in which acquired immunity is lost at the
end of each wave. On the contrary, no substantial differ-
ences, but for the timing of the epidemic spread, would be
expected if waves were determined by factors that do not
contribute to increase the effective reproductive number
(e.g. school closure in the Summer period or spontaneous
behavioural changes of the population in response to the
epidemic [36]).
Conclusion
Our results strongly suggest that governments stockpile
sufficient influenza antiviral drugs to treat approximately
25% of their populations, by assuming that R0 is not
much larger than 2. In fact, no suboptimal strategies,
based on the treatment of a fraction of cases on an age
basis, were found able to reduce remarkably both the clin-
ical attack rate and the antiviral stockpile required. In
countries where the number of antivirals stockpiled is well
below 25% of the population, treatment of elderly should
be considered as a priority if age-specific case fatality rate
were similar to that estimated for the 1969–70 influenza
pandemic in Italy, where deaths occurred primarily
among elder persons. On the contrary, treatment of adults
should be considered as a priority if age-specific case fatal-
ity rate were similar to that estimated for the 1918–19
influenza pandemic in Copenhagen, where deaths
occurred primarily among adult persons. In countries
where the number of antiviral stockpiled exceeds the
number required for the treatment of cases, providing
prophylaxis only to younger individuals is an option that
could be taken into account in the preparedness plans.
However, these results are influenced by the timing of
cases detection: administration of antivirals 48 hours after
the clinical onset of symptoms in the index cases dramat-
ically affects the efficacy of both treatment and prophy-
laxis.
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